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Pity the Child: The Age of
Delinquency in New York
Merril Sobie
In 1899 the State of Illinois established the nation‘s first
juvenile court.1 Quickly replicated throughout the country,
forty-six of the then forty-eight states, including New York, had
established separate tribunals devoted to children‘s cases by
1925.2 Although virtually every state initially restricted the
then novel court‘s jurisdiction to children less than sixteen
years of age,3 the overwhelming majority increased the juvenile
delinquency jurisdictional age in the decades immediately
following initial enactment.4 Today, in forty-eight states, a
child who is sixteen years of age will be adjudicated in a
juvenile or family court.5 Only two states, New York and North
Carolina, adhere to the original early twentieth century age
limitation.6 The present alignment dates from 2007, when
Connecticut became the forty-eighth state to embrace the
national norm.7 The next year, North Carolina established a
commission to consider raising the jurisdictional age and
recently a relevant legislative committee has introduced and
Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Chair, New York
State Bar Association, Committee on Children & the Law; New York State
Bar Fellow; Member, American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Committee;
McKinney‘s Commentator for the Family Court Act.
1. Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. The Court‘s jurisdiction
included juvenile delinquency and the neglect or abuse of a child by a parent
or other person responsible for the child.
2. See PAUL W. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 172-73 (1949). A
―juvenile delinquent‖ is a person under a specified age who has committed an
act which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime. The two 1925
―holdout‖ states were Maine and Wyoming—both of which had joined the
―juvenile court‖ bandwagon by the mid-1940s.
3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. Several states have established family courts, which combine cases
involving children, such as delinquency and child neglect, with other intrafamily cases, such as domestic violence and divorce.
6. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008).
7. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009).
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approved legislation to increase the jurisdictional age
limitation in that state.8 New York, and only New York,
stubbornly maintains the lower age threshold of adult criminal
responsibility without any consideration of the alternative.
This paper will first outline the national history of juvenile
courts, followed by New York‘s unique historical experience. It
will then discuss the recent Connecticut legislation, the North
Carolina efforts, and other twenty-first century developments
in juvenile courts‘ jurisdiction. Finally, the paper will discuss
the desirability of similar New York legislation that would
raise the jurisdictional age limitation, as well as its possible
ramifications.
A Short National History
On the eve of the twentieth century, Illinois established
the first Juvenile Court, a tribunal largely dedicated to the
rehabilitation of children who had either engaged in criminal
activities, or whose parents had neglected, abused or
abandoned them.9 In one sense, the court was revolutionary—
for the first time in Anglo-American legal history a separate
court, presided over by specialized ―children‘s judges,‖
determined the lives of children. Viewed from a different
perspective, the Illinois court was the culmination of juvenile
justice developments that had occurred throughout the
nineteenth century, including, notably, the adjudication and
treatment of youths who were found to have violated the penal
law provisions.
The evolution commenced when the New York House of
Refuge was chartered in 1824,10 quickly followed by the
establishment of similar institutions in Pennsylvania11 and
Massachusetts.12
The movement to ameliorate the
consequences of a criminal conviction by developing houses of
refuge, reform schools, and private religious-based as well as
8. See S. 1048, 2009-2010 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2009).
9. Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
10. Act of Jan. 28, 1826, 1826 N.Y. Laws 18, 18. See also ROBERT M.
MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1825-1940, at 3-4 (1973); infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
11. See MENNEL, supra note 10, at 3-5.
12. See id.
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non-sectarian residential homes, expanded steadily throughout
the century.13 ―By 1890 nearly every state outside of the South
had some type of reform school for boys and often a separate
institution for girls. . . . [T]hese institutions cared for most of
the delinquent children in the United States and for numerous
destitute children as well.‖14
By the late nineteenth century, state legislatures had also
established a uniform age limitation of sixteen for placement in
a specialized juvenile institution: ―In every school, children had
to be younger than 16 at the time of commitment; the lower age
for commitment varied . . . between 7 and 11.‖15 The national
age standard followed several decades in which some states
experimented with different age limitations.16 The reasoning
behind the age sixteen national consensus is unclear. Perhaps
in the late Victorian era, children above that age were viewed
as young adults; or perhaps the jurisdictional age was simply
copied from state to state.
The 1899 Illinois Act was quickly replicated throughout
the United States. The ―watershed‖ year was 1903, when at
least six states enacted virtually identical laws establishing
juvenile courts.17 Not surprisingly, the natural standard of age
at the time, sixteen, was almost universally followed. In 1903,
for example, California,18 Pennsylvania,19 Maryland,20 Rhode
Island,21 and Indiana22 all established age sixteen as the
jurisdictional cut-off age for their newly-founded juvenile
13. ―For a quarter of a century [1825-1850] the activities of these three
institutions defined institutional treatment of juvenile delinquents.‖ Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id.
16. See infra pp. 1067-76 (discussing New York‘s experience).
17. See INT‘L PRISON COMM‘N, CHILDREN‘S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES:
THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESULTS, H.R. REP. NO. 58-701, at app. 16587 (1904).
18. Act of Feb. 26, 1903, 1903 Cal. Stat. 44 (―This act shall apply only to
children under the age of sixteen (16) . . . .‖). See also H.R. REP. NO. 58-701,
at app. 165-68.
19. Act of Mar. 10, 1903, 1903 Ind. Acts 516, 518. See also H.R. REP. NO.
58-701, at app. 182-85.
20. Act of Apr. 23, 1903, 1903 Pa. Laws 274. See also H.R. REP. NO. 58701, at app. 185-86.
21. Act of Apr. 8, 1904, 1904 Md. Laws 906. See also H.R. REP. NO. 58701, at app. 187.
22. Act of June 15, 1898, 1898 R.I. Acts & Resolves 40. See also H.R.
REP. NO. 58-701, at app. 179-82.
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courts.
Within one decade, twenty-two jurisdictions had
established juvenile courts, and by 1925, every state save two
had enacted similar legislation.23 The juvenile court movement
had spread like wildfire. As noted, an age limitation of sixteen
had characterized the initial legislation. Expanding twentieth
century social work and child psychology concepts, coupled
with the fact that the new courts were generally perceived as
successful, however, influenced legislatures to increase the
courts‘ jurisdictional reach. By 1927, twenty-eight of the fortyeight states had raised the jurisdictional age to eighteen, and
most of the remaining twenty states had raised the age
limitation to seventeen.24 At the turn of the twenty-first
century, thirty-seven states maintained age eighteen, ten
states and the District of Columbia opted for age seventeen,
and only three states, Connecticut, North Carolina and New
York, remained unchanged at age sixteen. Connecticut joined
the ranks of ―age eighteen‖ states in 2008,25 thus raising the
total number to thirty-eight and leaving North Carolina26 and
New York as the only current holdouts adhering to the original,
circa 1900, jurisdictional limitation.27
Significantly, the jurisdictional ―juvenile court age‖ has
almost always been identical, regardless of the type of
proceeding.28 As has been noted, age sixteen was the original
common jurisdictional age for juvenile delinquency, status
offenses, and child neglect or abuse; today it is eighteen. As
noted by one commentator, ―[t]he jurisdictional age is generally
the same for all children and all forms of conduct.‖29
Nationally, the cut-off age for child neglect or abuse is
eighteen, while thirty-eight of the fifty states maintain the
23. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 172.
24. See generally HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1972). Wyoming, the last state to establish a juvenile court, had set
the age limitation of age nineteen, but reduced the age to eighteen in 1993.
Act of Feb. 16, 1993, 1993 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1, 1-2. See also Thomas v.
Thomas, 913 P.2d 854, 855 (Wyo. 1996).
25. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501(7) (2010).
27. North Carolina is presently considering an increase. See supra note
8 and accompanying text.
28. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 10 (2d ed. 2009).
29. Id. at 10.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/8

4

2010]

PITY THE CHILD

1065

same age for juvenile delinquency.30
However, the juvenile delinquency age limitation is not
absolute. Most states adhere to the general rule, but exempt
very violent offenses committed by older adolescents. The
exemptions vary, as do the implementation mechanisms. The
majority of states provide for ―transfer,‖ whereby juvenile
courts determine whether an older adolescent who is accused of
committing a violent felony should be treated as a juvenile or,
alternatively, should be transferred to adult courts for criminal
prosecution.31 Other states permit a prosecutor to ―direct file‖
in the criminal court, thereby by-passing the juvenile court.32
Still others exempt certain enumerated offenses committed by
older children from juvenile court jurisdiction entirely.33
Although there is considerable variation, no state in the Union
treats a seventeen-year-old murderer as a juvenile delinquent,
and most exclude violent assaults and first degree sex offenses.
Nonetheless, the limited exceptions prove the rule. The vast
majority of American children under the age of eighteen who
engage in criminal activities are deemed to be delinquent
rather than criminal.34

30. The jurisdictional age limitation is also at least eighteen in several
other nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom, China, and France.
See Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and
the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2008). Austria,
Germany, and Spain have extended the juvenile court age to twenty-one. See
id.
31. See DAVIS, supra note 28, at 37-48.
32. See id.
33. See DAVIS, supra note 28, at 30-43 (providing a detailed analysis of
the often byzantine procedures).
34. An interesting aspect of juvenile delinquency and the age of the
children is the lack of a minimum age, or a very low minimum age, at which a
child may be charged with committing a crime and hence be deemed a
juvenile delinquent. Only fifteen states maintain a minimum age, ranging
from six to ten. See DON CIPRIANI, CHILDREN‘S RIGHTS AND THE MINIMUM AGE
OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 117-18 (2009). See, e.g.,
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008) (establishing a minimum age
of seven). Almost all developed nations maintain higher minimum ages; for
example, in Australia and Britain the minimum age is 10, see CIPRIANI,
supra, at 188, 220, and in Germany the age is 14, see id. at 198.
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New York History
In tandem with the national history, the reform and
rehabilitation of New York children who have engaged in
criminal activity—and their segregation from adult
transgressors—dates from the early nineteenth century. In
1816, two prominent Quaker reformers, Thomas Eddy and
John Griscom, established the New York Society for the
Prevention of Pauperism for the purpose of advocating and
implementing juvenile justice reforms.35 Vividly portraying the
vice of incarcerating children in the adult penitentiary,36 the
Society publicized the plight of children accused of committing
non-violent crimes and lobbied extensively for legislative
reform.37 In 1824, the Society succeeded, securing legislation
incorporating the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile
Delinquents and authorizing the establishment of a New York
House of Refuge to rehabilitate juvenile transgressors.38 Two
years later, the state legislature authorized the courts to place
with the newly constructed House of Refuge, in lieu of
imprisonment, any child convicted of committing a criminal
offense anywhere in the state.39
Pursuant to the original legislation, placement by a court
35. See ROBERT S. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE, ORIGINS
REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1815-1857, at 23-30 (1969).
36.

OF

JUVENILE

We are sorry to be informed, by the mayor, that since he has
administered our criminal jurisprudence, the unpleasant
task has devolved on him, of sentencing boys, from twelve to
fifteen and seventeen years of age, several times to the
penitentiary. . . . [I]f any thing can destroy the
ingenuousness and rectitude of youth, and open a road to
ruin, it is the polluting society of those veterans in guilt and
wickedness, who hold their reign in our prisons of
punishment . . . .
MANAGERS OF THE SOC‘Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 34-35 (1820).
37. See MERRIL SOBIE, THE CREATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF
NEW YORK‘S CHILDREN‘S LAWS 26-28 (1987).
38. Act of Mar. 29, 1824, 1824 N.Y. Laws 110.
39. Act of Jan. 28, 1826, 1826 N.Y. Laws 18, 18. Construction of the
House of Refuge, located in New York City at Broadway and Twenty-Third
Street, an area later developed as Madison Park, was apparently completed
by 1826.
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was purely discretionary, but in 1830 the legislature
empowered the Governor to authorize prison administrators to
―. . . convey any convicts who shall be under the age of
seventeen years, to the house of refuge in the [C]ity of NewYork.‖40 The transition was completed in 1846, when the
legislature established the Western House of Refuge near
Rochester,41 and mandated the commitment of convicted
children to a house of refuge, thereby precluding imprisonment
in a penitentiary:
[T]he courts of criminal jurisdiction of the several
counties . . . shall sentence to said house of
refuge every male under the age of eighteen
years, and every female under the age of
seventeen years, who shall be convicted before
such court of any felony.42
Remarkably, in 1846, New York had prohibited the
imprisonment of sixteen and seventeen year old children, an
achievement which has eluded this state throughout the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries.43
The houses of refuge were privately maintained, albeit
publicly funded.44 Governmentally operated facilities were
unknown until the twentieth century. The next step in the
evolution of children‘s laws was the post-civil war development
of child protective laws. The first child neglect statute was
enacted in 1877.45 Simultaneously, the State authorized and
funded the development of residential child care agencies for

40. Act of Apr. 16, 1830, 1830 N.Y. Laws 205, 205. In permitting prison
administrators to supersede court-ordered imprisonment, the statute appears
to constitute a remarkable infringement of judicial discretion.
41. Act of May 8, 1846, 1846 N.Y. Laws 150, 150.
42. Id. at 154.
43. See id. It applies at least to boys, who then and now account for the
overwhelming majority of delinquents.
Why the legislature excluded
seventeen year old girls is mysterious. It also bears mentioning that the
early houses of refuge were strict, locked facilities, akin to the present secure
training schools. The goal was to segregate adolescents for purposes of
punishment and, hopefully, to rehabilitate the children through isolation and
time.
44. See SOBIE, supra note 37, at 29.
45. Act of June 6, 1877, 1877 N.Y. Laws 486.
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abandoned, neglected, and delinquent children.46 An 1884 Act
mandated that children under the age of sixteen who were
convicted of misdemeanors be committed to child care agencies
in lieu of commitment to prisons or houses of refuge; while
children under the age of sixteen who were convicted of felonies
could, in the discretion of the court, be ―. . . placed in charge of
any suitable person or institution willing to receive him.‖47 The
dispositional alternatives, circa 1884, closely resemble the
current Family Court Act dispositional provisions which govern
juvenile delinquency cases.48
The late nineteenth century legislation, unlike the 1846
statute, established age sixteen as the jurisdictional age
limitation. Regardless of the possible rationale for excluding
sixteen and seventeen-year-old children,49 New York‘s firm
policy of excluding older adolescents had taken root.
With the turn of the twentieth century, the emphasis
shifted from dispositional rules to structural and procedural
reform. Following several temporary measures, the New York
legislature authorized separate Children‘s Court parts
throughout the state in 1903—precisely the year in which
several states50 were enacting more radical legislation
establishing independent juvenile courts:
All cases involving the commitment or trial
of children, actually or apparently under the age
of sixteen years, for any violation of law, in any
court shall be heard and determined by such
court, at suitable times to be designated
therefore by it, separate and apart from the trial
of other criminal cases . . . in a separate
courtroom to be known as the children‘s court . . .
.51
46. See SOBIE, supra note 37, at 60-62.
47. Act of Mar. 21, 1884, 1884 N.Y. Laws 44, 47.
48. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 352.2 (McKinney 2008).
49. Perhaps the legislature thought that the increasing ameliorative
provisions were unsuitable for older youths.
50. See supra notes 18-22.
51. Act of May 6, 1903, 1903 N.Y. Laws 676, 677. An 1892 predecessor
statute mandated that children under the age of sixteen be tried separately
from adults, and that the courts maintain separate records for children. See
Act of Apr. 5, 1982, 1892 N.Y. Laws 459, 459-60. The progression was from
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Two years later, the legislature stipulated that the commission
of a crime by a child under the age of sixteen, which was not
capital or punishable by life imprisonment, would be deemed a
misdemeanor only,52 and, in 1909, the legislature
decriminalized most youthful offenses, formalizing the term
―juvenile delinquency‖:
A child of more than seven and less than sixteen
years of age, who shall commit any act or
omission which, if committed by an adult, would
be a crime not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any
crime, but of juvenile delinquency only . . . .53
New York thereby joined the large number of states that
had substituted a juvenile delinquency finding for a criminal
conviction.54 Following the early twentieth century national
norm, the legislature established age sixteen as the
jurisdictional ceiling—or, more accurately, continued the late
nineteenth century limitation. New York, however, did not at
that time establish a separate juvenile court, preferring instead
the continuation of its specialized Children‘s Court parts.
The Children‘s Court parts were nevertheless short lived.
Finally bowing to the national movement, New York
established the New York State Children‘s Court in 1922 for
counties outside of New York City,55 and, two years later,
enacted a similar Act to govern the City.56 For purposes of the
Act, a ―child‖ was defined as a person under sixteen years of
age,57 a definition which encompassed delinquency, status
offenses and child neglect. In fact, from the late nineteenth
century until the establishment of the Family Court in 1962,58
segregated proceedings and records to segregated court parts, i.e., separate
courtrooms.
52. Act of May 29, 1905, 1905 N.Y. Laws 1664, 1666.
53. Act of May 25, 1909, 1909 N.Y. Laws 1163, 1163.
54. See, e.g., supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
55. Act of Apr. 10, 1922, 1922 N.Y. Laws 1259, 1261.
56. Act of Apr. 23, 1924, 1924 N.Y. Laws 493, 494-95.
57. Id. at 495.
58. Act of Apr. 24, 1962, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043.
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a span embracing almost a century, the jurisdictional age
remained fixed at sixteen. The Court could not entertain a
case involving a child above that age, regardless of whether the
matter involved a juvenile delinquent, a status offender, or a
child who was the victim of child neglect or abuse.
As the twentieth century progressed, adherence to the low
threshold criminal age of responsibility age became
controversial; reform advocacy intensified as state after state
increased the jurisdictional age limitation. A 1931 New York
State Crime Commission report criticized the rigid
differentiation between the Children‘s Court and the Criminal
Court, and suggested remediation (however non-specific):
The sharp distinction in the criminal law
between children over sixteen and those under
sixteen is well illustrated in New York City,
where the Children‘s Court is under equity
proceedings. A child under sixteen, since 1925,
may not be charged with a criminal act. In all
breaches of the peace, save for a capital offense,
he becomes the ward of the court, rather than its
prisoner. He is not arraigned as a criminal . . .
nor is he fingerprinted or otherwise classified for
purposes of criminal identification. . . . He may
not be detained in a jail . . . the services of
physicians, psychiatrists and of psychologists are
sometimes provided, to assist the judge in
determining treatment.
. . . If, however, a child is above the age of
sixteen, by as much as a single day, he is subject
to all the rigors of the adult courts; of police
arrest, of jail detention . . . and, in many
instances, of sentence as a felon to a reformatory
or state prison where he mingles with hardened
adult criminals. . . .
The paradox in this
situation has been apparent to many for a long
while. From a remedial point of view, in light of
the abuses to which adolescents are subject,
when in contact with the criminal law, a
practical solution can probably be arrived at . . .
to modify the harshness of the criminal law in its
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relation to adolescent offenders.59
The 1931 Crime Commission Report, which reads as
though it could have been written yesterday, did not influence
the legislature and thus remains relevant. Later that decade,
―. . . the Joint Legislative Committee on Children‘s Court
Jurisdiction and Juvenile Delinquency (1937 to 1942) explored
whether the juvenile delinquency age should be increased. It
found ‗strongly divided opinion‘ and recommended that in the
absence of ‗any kind of majority sentiment‘ of the sort that
produced the Children‘s Court, the jurisdictional age be
maintained at 16.‖60 Revisiting the issue shortly before the
establishment of the Family Court, the Temporary Commission
on the Courts ―. . . concluded that any increase in the juvenile
delinquency age in the Children‘s courts or any expansion of its
jurisdiction to include youthful offenders would be
‗undesirable.‘‖61 The continuing efforts of children‘s advocates,
bolstered by the fact that, by then, virtually every other state
had raised the jurisdictional age, could not persuade New
York‘s legislative leaders.
This brings us to the 1962 Family Court Act. At the 1961
Constitutional Convention, which established the Family
Court, the issue of New York‘s low age threshold was debated
extensively. Finding an absence of a strong consensus, the
Convention deferred a decision. The Constitution, drafted at
the Convention and enacted by the legislature and the public at
large, was accordingly intentionally flexible and incorporated
the following non-age specific provision:
The family court shall have jurisdiction over
the following classes of actions and proceedings
which shall be originated in such family court in
the manner provided by law: (1) the protection,
treatment, correction and commitment of those
minors who are in need of the exercise of the
authority of the court because of circumstances of
59. HARRY M. SHULMAN, THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER: A STATISTICAL STUDY
OF CRIME AMONG THE 16-20 YEAR AGE GROUP IN NEW YORK CITY 150-52 (1931).
60. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, YOUNG
OFFENDERS AND COURT REORGANIZATION 5 (1963).
61. Id.
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neglect, delinquency or dependency, as the
legislature may determine . . . .62
Explaining the Convention‘s decision to defer a
jurisdictional modification and to draft a remarkably flexible
and unique constitutional provision,63 the framers overtly
permitted, indeed invited, a change by a simple legislative act,
rather than by the cumbersome constitutional amendment
process. The official legislative committee comment to the
original Family Court Act section states the reasoning:
This section follows existing law in limiting
juvenile delinquency to persons under sixteen
years of age. This decision is tentative and
subject to change upon completion of a study of
the Youthful Offender Act and the Wayward
Minor Law and observation of the functioning of
the new court with the program of law guardians
established under Article 1.
The Joint
Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization
plans to complete the study and submit
legislation in 1963.64
The Joint Legislative Committee indeed completed a study
in 1963. Its published report, however, came to no firm
decision, concluding with the comment: ―We look forward to the
advice and recommendations of others on these difficult
matters.‖65 The 1963 report final paragraph included the
following bold statement:
Given this constitutional language, this
Committee has concluded that the Legislature is
under a constitutional mandate to examine again
the question of whether the juvenile delinquency
age should be changed or other arrangements
62. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 13(b).
63. Other jurisdictional grants are explicit.
64. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, THE
FAMILY COURT ACT REPORT 110 (1962) (emphasis added).
65. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, supra
note 60, at 3.
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made for dealing with young offenders. In its
judgment, the decisions of the past must now be
subordinated to the policies of the new
constitutional amendment. And these policies
require a practical judgment, based on current
experiences and realistic estimates, as to how the
courts of the unified state court system may be
most effectively used to deal with problems of
youth.66
At that point the legislative history ends. The promise to
submit legislation in 1963 was apparently unfulfilled. The
constitutional mandate to re-examine the question of whether
the juvenile delinquency age should be changed was ignored.
The ―tentative‖ 1962 decision has remained in effect for fortyfive years, with, astonishingly, no recorded organized effort to
seek a modification.
Interestingly, the 1961 Constitutional Convention
differentiated delinquency, status offenses, and child neglect
for jurisdictional age purposes. As discussed, virtually every
state, including New York, had originally limited juvenile court
jurisdiction across the board to age sixteen.67 In subsequent
decades, almost every state had raised its age limitation for the
three major children‘s law causes of action, continuing the
principle that a child below a certain threshold age should be
treated as a child, regardless of the type of proceeding. New
York, while adhering to the principle of a unified age,
steadfastly refused to increase the original jurisdictional
limitation. For almost one century, from 1865 to 1962, the
jurisdictional age for purposes of delinquency, child neglect,
and status offenses remained frozen at sixteen.
The 1962 Family Court Act finally raised the jurisdictional
age limitation for girls accused of committing status offenses or
alleged to be neglected to eighteen, while maintaining age
sixteen as the cutoff for similarly situated boys.68
The
modification, which appears to constitute a compromise, broke
the, by then, eighty-year policy of parity, which had been a
66. N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, supra
note 64, at 6.
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68. Act of Apr. 24, 1962, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3043, 3106.
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constant theme both in New York and at the national level.
Fifteen years later, the jurisdictional age of neglect was raised
to eighteen for boys, inaugurating the present jurisdictional
limitation for both genders.69 In 1972, the New York Court of
Appeals had found the gender differentiation for status
offenses unconstitutional,70 effectively restoring age sixteen for
that cause of action, and prompting the 1977 statutory change
for child neglect cases.71 Finally, in 2001 the legislature raised
the status offense age to eighteen for both sexes.72 Ironically,
the legislative findings underpinning the 2001 amendment cite
―. . . a recognition that teens under the age of 18 need
supervision, guidance and support to grow and mature into
responsible adults.‖73 The findings could just as readily justify
raising the juvenile delinquency age limitation.
Today, New York maintains an age limitation of eighteen
for child protective actions (neglect or abuse) and for status
offense actions.74 In that respect, the state adheres to the
national norm. However, this state has thus far failed to
similarly adjust delinquency jurisdiction in accord with the
national consensus. In most states, a child remains a child
until the age of emancipation, regardless of the issue.75 In New
York, a child remains a child until the age of emancipation,
unless and until he is accused of committing a crime.
Twenty-First Century Revelations
The perception of adolescent criminality has been
significantly altered in the past decade, moving from a ―get
tough on child predators‖ paradigm to one which emphasizes
the diminished responsibility of children. Several factors have
contributed to the ameliorative trend: a) a major decrease in
the juvenile crime rate, and an even more pronounced
diminution in the juvenile violent crime rate; b) studies
69. Act of Aug. 1, 1977, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1.
70. See A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 89 (1972).
71. Act of Aug. 1, 1977, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1.
72. Act of Oct. 29, 2001, 2001 N.Y. Laws 2777, 2824.
73. Id.
74. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 712, 1012 (McKinney 2009).
75. Although that is compromised by waiver and transfer provisions in
several states.
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showing conclusively that treating youths as adults, and
thereby incarcerating them in adult penal institutions—as
opposed
to
juvenile
facilities—dramatically
increases
recidivism; and c) research proving that older adolescents are
not as fully developed neurologically as adults and, as every
parent knows innately, their ability to exercise sound judgment
or control impulsive behavior is accordingly compromised. This
section will present a summary of these developments.
The late twentieth century witnessed a major upsurge of
criminality, both adult and juvenile. Between 1965 and 1980,
the juvenile violent crime and homicide rates doubled and,
after a brief interlude, continued to increase until 1994.76 Not
surprisingly, the legislative response was to selectively
increase the number of children prosecuted as adults.77 Except
Wyoming, however, no state raised the general juvenile
delinquency age limitation.78 By the end of the century, the
upsurge had reversed, and the juvenile crime rate plummeted.
Between 1994 and 2003, the juvenile arrest rate for violent
crimes decreased thirty-two percent79 and the trend has
continued, albeit at a less dramatic rate.
Thus, while in 1994 the arrest rate of children (ages 10-17)
for violent crimes was over 500 per 100,000 (or, approximately
one-half of one percent), by 2007 the violent crime arrest rate
had decreased to slightly less than 300 per 100,000 (or, an
arrest rate of one-third of one percent).80 The arrest rate for
murder was even more pronounced, falling from 14 per 100,000
children to 4 per 100,000.81 The decrease in the property crime
index was equally dramatic, from 2,500 per 100,000 children in
1994 (2.5%) to 1,250 per 100,000 children in 2007 (1.25%).82

76. See BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL
28-30 (2d ed. 2009).
77. See id. at 30, chs. 6, 8.
78. Technically an exception, Wyoming reduced the age limitation from
nineteen to the national norm of eighteen. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-201
(2008).
79. See FELD, supra note 76, at 29.
80. See Charles Puzzanchera, Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUV. JUST. BULL.
(Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice,
Wash.,
D.C.),
Dec.
2009,
at
1,
5,
available
at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf.
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id. at 5.
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Only half as many children committed property crimes in 2007
as did thirteen years earlier.83 The available contemporary
statistics also highlight the petty nature of juvenile crime,
although that is not a new development. For example, in 2007,
200,300 children were arrested for larceny, 111,800 for
vandalism, and 201,200 for disorderly conduct.84 In contrast,
only 34,490 were arrested for robbery, 7,200 for arson, and
3,580 for forcible rape.85
The recent decrease in adolescent violent crime is reflected
not only in the overall delinquency rate, but also in the number
of New York children who are detained or placed in training
schools (a violent youth is far more likely to be detained
pending disposition and subsequently placed upon a finding of
delinquency). A ―snapshot‖ study by the Vera Institute of
Justice found that in just two years, from 2004 to 2006, the
number of alleged juvenile delinquents who were securely
detained decreased by approximately one-third, from 2,985 to
2,046 (excluding New York City).86 During the same period,
the number of children placed by the Family Court with Office
of Children and Family Services Training Schools statewide
decreased from 2,234 to 1,777.87
The downward spiral
continues: in 2008 only 813 children were placed by the Court
in state training schools; the number of placements plummeted
approximately sixty percent in four years.88 Nationally and
locally, the juvenile crime rate has significantly decreased
while at least in New York, the number of children
83. Id.
84. See id. at 3.
85. See id. The number of arrests presents a somewhat inflated picture
in light of the fact that arrests do not necessarily resort in prosecutions and
may evidence a degree of overcharging; other cases were undoubtedly
dismissed after the filing of an accusatory instrument.
86. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, WIDENING THE LENS 2008: A PANORAMIC VIEW
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE 8 (2008), available at
http://www.vera.org/download?file=1810/VERA%2BReport1_6_09.pdf.
The
statistics cited above tallied the number of detentions, including children,
who had been detained more than once; the number of different children
detained in 2006 totaled 1,719. Id. at 8.
87. Id. at 17.
88. See Admissions of Juvenile Delinquents and Juvenile Offenders to
Institutions 1998-2008, CHILD WELFARE WATCH (Ctr. for an Urban Future,
New York, N.Y.), Fall 2009, at 12, 12. In 2004-2008, the number of
delinquent youths placed in privately-operated residential non-secure
programs remained constant, at approximately 800 per year. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/8

16

2010]

PITY THE CHILD

1077

incarcerated in facilities for juvenile delinquents has decreased
dramatically.
Recidivism is perhaps the most salient gauge of the
juvenile justice system‘s effectiveness—in fact, a more accurate
measure than the juvenile crime rate. After all, a child of
seventeen is likely to be back on the streets when in his
twenties, regardless of the crime of conviction or the
adjudicating court. Surprisingly, until recently there were few,
if any, studies that compared children who were treated as
delinquents in family and juvenile courts—and accordingly
placed in juvenile facilities—with their similar brethren, who
were prosecuted as adults—and accordingly serve time in adult
jails and penitentiaries. That empirical void has now been
filled, and the studies show conclusively that children who are
incarcerated with adults have significantly higher recidivism
rates, even when they have committed the same crimes in
similar circumstances.89
Perhaps the most interesting recidivism study—and the
most relevant to this article—compared recidivism rates in
New York and New Jersey. New York maintains a juvenile
delinquency age limitation of sixteen; New Jersey, however,
adheres to the national norm of eighteen.90 Hence, a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old who commits an offense will be adjudicated
in a juvenile court in New Jersey, while his New York
counterpart will be adjudicated and sentenced as an adult. The
study found that children prosecuted in New York were 85
percent more likely to be re-arrested for violent crimes, and 44
percent more likely to be re-arrested for felony property crimes,
than similarly situated New Jersey teenagers.91 Thus, New
York‘s approach is clearly counter-productive.
The final development is the recent neurological and
89. See generally, e.g., Andrea McGowan et al., Effects on Violence of
Laws and Policies Facilitating the Transfer of Juveniles From the Juvenile
Justice System to the Adult System: A Systematic Review, 32 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 7 (Supp. Apr. 2007); Lawrence Winner et al., The
Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Reexamining Recidivism Over the
Long Term, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 548 (1997).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-23 (West 2010).
91. See JOHN D. AND CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND, THE CHANGING
BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE ADULT
CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E Zimring eds., 2006), in
Birckhead, supra note 30, at 1461.
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psychological studies relating to adolescent brain development.
The news on that front is not entirely new. From Aristotle to
post-Freudian psychiatrists, experts have anecdotally
documented and discussed adolescent impulsive, experimental,
peer-driven, and immature or inappropriate behavior.92 What
is new is the neurological research, including brain scanning
technology, that has provided scientific proof of the age-old
assumptions and experiences.93
Of perhaps even greater significance is the influence of the
high tech findings on juvenile justice, doctrinally and in
practice, including the concept of ―diminished responsibility,‖
i.e., the principle that children and, to a lesser extent, young
adults, should not be held as accountable as adults for their
criminal activities.
This short paper is not the place to outline, much less
critique, the available literature. Instead, I will rely solely on
the United States Supreme Court, and its landmark 2005 case
of Roper v. Simmons, which determined that persons under the
age of eighteen could not be punished capitally.94 In reaching
that conclusion, the Court made the following lengthy
observations:
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific
and sociological studies respondent and his amici
cite tend to confirm, ―[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found
in youth more often than in adults and are more
understandable among the young.
These
qualities often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.‖ Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); see also Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-116 (―Even the
normal 16-year old customarily lacks the
maturity of an adult‖). It has been noted that
―adolescents are overrepresented statistically in
virtually every category of reckless behavior.‖ J.
92. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 49-69 (2005)
(providing an excellent contemporary description of adolescent psychology
and its impact on juvenile criminality).
93. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
94. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescents: A
Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL
REV. 339 (1992).
In recognition of the
comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of
juveniles, almost every State prohibits those
under 18 years of age from voting, serving on
juries, or marrying without parental consent.
The second area of difference is that
juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure. Eddings, 455 U.S. at
115 (―[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.
It is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to
psychological damage‖). This is explained in part
by the prevailing circumstances that juveniles
have less control, or less experience with control,
over their own environment.
See Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by
Reason
of
Adolescence:
Developmental
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
1009, 1014 (2003) (―[A]s legal minors, [juveniles]
lack the freedom that adults have to extricate
themselves from a setting‖).
The third broad difference is that the
character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult. The personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed. See
generally E. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND
CRISIS (1968).
These differences render suspect any
conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders.
The susceptibility of juveniles to
immature and irresponsible behavior means
―their irresponsible conduct is not as morally
reprehensible as that of an adult.‖ Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality
opinion).
Their own vulnerability and
comparative lack of control over their immediate
surroundings mean juveniles have a greater
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claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole
environment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan J., dissenting).
The reality that juveniles still struggle to define
their identity means it is less supportable to
conclude that even a heinous crime committed by
a juvenile is evidence of irretrievable depraved
character. From a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists
that a minor‘s character deficiencies will be
reformed. Indeed, ―[t]he relevance of youth as a
mitigating factor derives from the fact that the
signature qualifies of youth are transient; as
individuals mature, the impetuousness and
recklessness that may dominate in younger years
can subside.‖ Johnson, 509 U.S. at 368; see also
Steinberg & Scott, supra, at 1014 (―For most
teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting;
they cease with maturity as individual identity
becomes settled.
Only a relatively small
proportion of adolescents who experiment in
risky or illegal activities develop entrenched
patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood‖).95
Whether the crime is murder, as it was in Roper, or petit
larceny, the most common crime committed by juveniles, the
Supreme Court‘s analysis remains equally valid. Holding
sixteen and seventeen-year-old children as criminally
accountable as adults is poor policy, a conclusion that has been
validated and accepted scientifically and jurisprudently.

95. Id. at 569-70 (some internal citations omitted) (some internal
citations formatted from original).
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Contemporary Developments and Age
The contemporary sociological, psychological, and
neurological studies, coupled with the juvenile crime rate
reversal (from ―crime wave‖ proportions to an almost historical
post-World War II low), has resulted in a broad reconsideration
of juvenile justice policy and practice. Roper, where the
Supreme Court reversed its holding in Stanford v. Kentucky,96
a case decided only sixteen years earlier, is one example of the
new paradigm. In the past few years, the application of harsh
criminal sanctions to juveniles, such as life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, have been questioned.97 To be
sure, the dominant late-twentieth century ―get tough‖ attitude
has not vanished, but has at least been partially eclipsed by the
growing movement toward balance and amelioration.
Revisiting the general jurisdictional age limitation is an
integral, albeit limited, feature of the national movement:
integral because it is central to juvenile justice, but limited
because only three states subscribed to the lower threshold at
the beginning of this century. One of those three states,
Connecticut, has since raised the jurisdictional age to
eighteen.98 A second, North Carolina, has embarked on a
similar path: bills to raise the age limitation to eighteen have
been approved by the North Carolina House Judiciary
Committee and are pending before the state Senate‘s Judiciary
Committee.99 That leaves New York in isolation, as the only
state in the Union which, to this date, has yet to take any
legislative action.
The Connecticut law that raised the State‘s jurisdictional
age from sixteen to eighteen was enacted in 2001, and has
become fully effective as of 2010.100 The recidivism studies and
the decreasing crime rate were helpful to the Connecticut
96. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
97. For example, the American Bar Association has opposed
continuation of life without the possibility of parole.
98. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2009).
99. See S. 1048, 2009-2010 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.C. 2009). North Carolina
has also established a task force to study and report on this issue. See North
Carolina Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
http://www.juvjus.state.nc.us/youthAccountabilityTaskForce/taskForce.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2010). A final report is due in January 2011.
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121.
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movement. The key factor, however, was the prevalence, as
publicized by the reform advocates, of non-serious offenses
committed by children, as opposed to the commission of violent
offenses.101 In every jurisdiction, the large majority of the
crimes which children commit are property offenses, such as
larceny, automobile theft, and vandalism, or, to a lesser extent,
personal crimes such as misdemeanor assault. For example, in
the United States, 468,200 persons under the age of eighteen
were arrested for larceny and 145,300 were charged with
vandalism in 1992, while only 45,700 were charged with
robbery, and only 3,300 were charged with murder or nonnegligent manslaughter.102 When the Connecticut legislative
sponsors excluded the relatively small number of violent
felonies from the proposed legislation (thus retaining criminal
jurisdiction for those offenses), there was little perceived
justification to continue general criminal jurisdiction.103 The
relevant Connecticut Joint Legislative Committee Report
explained the decision:
Each year, 10,000 Connecticut children can be
expected to go through the [then] adult system.
About two of them will have killed someone. We
believe it is better to design a system for the
10,000 than for the two. There will still be
provision to move violent youths to the adult
system – we are not talking about giving anyone
a pass for serious crimes. The vast majority of
minors, however, could be better held
accountable in the juvenile system, where
rehabilitative services have been proven to put
youths back on the track, rather than the adult
system, an ideal environment to create career
criminals. The experience of other states proves

101. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
102. OFF. OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP‘T
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A NATIONAL REPORT 100
(1995).
103. The Connecticut Act grants unlimited initial jurisdiction to the
juvenile court, but for the most violent offenses, mandates transfer to the
criminal courts upon application of the prosecutor. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46b-121.
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this.104
North Carolina has not yet followed Connecticut, or at
least has not followed quickly. However, a considerable
movement for change has developed.105 A bill to raise the
jurisdictional age limitation has been introduced in the North
Carolina legislature, approved by its House Judiciary
Committee, and forwarded to the Appropriations Committee.106
There appears to be considerable momentum, although only
time will tell whether North Carolina will join the forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia where the jurisdictional age
limitation is greater than sixteen, and leave New York as the
last American holdout.107
Implementation and Ramifications
Adjusting the jurisdictional age limitation would be a
relatively simple exercise.
In fact, the feat may be
accomplished through a one-page bill amending a few sections
in the Family Court Act and Penal Law. The New York State
Constitution was intentionally drafted to permit just such a
simple amending procedure. However, it is unlikely that the
legislature would apply the precise existing juvenile justice
structure to the older adolescent population, and it is
questionable whether even the proponents of change would opt
for strict equalization. Moreover, an amendment would entail
significant ramifications to the judicial and executive branches
of government, both state and local, which the bill would need
to address.

104. H. Ted Rubin, Juvenile or Adult Jurisdiction? Age Changes in the
States, JUV. JUST. UPDATE, Dec./Jan. 2008, at 1, 2 (quoting CONN. JUVENILE
JURISDICTION & IMPLEMENTATION COMM.).
105. See, e.g., Birckhead, supra note 30, at 1493-94.
106. H.R. 1414 (N.C. 2009).
107. Illinois has historically maintained age seventeen as the cutoff.
Recently, however, there has been an interesting compromise. The state has
raised the jurisdictional age to eighteen for misdemeanors and has
established a task force to consider adding felony arrests. See Jeff Long,
Illinois Increases Juvenile Court Age Cutoff to 17, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 2010,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chicago/ct-x-juvenile-court20100312,0,2576685.story.
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The most important decision, assuming an increase in the
general age jurisdictional limitation, is where to draw the line.
No state defines juvenile delinquency to include every criminal
act committed by every person under the age of eighteen (or
seventeen).
The universal exclusions include homicide,
attempted murder, aggravated assault,108 and first degree
sexual offenses.109 Beyond the list of obvious ―horror‖ crimes,
there is a striking lack of a consensus regarding other violent
offenses committed by the upper juvenile age group, which
should fall under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. As has
been noted, some states permit ―direct filing‖ in criminal court
of the more egregious violent charges, such as robbery; others
preclude criminal prosecution; while still others permit
―transfer‖ of such cases in the discretion of the juvenile court or
in the discretion of the prosecutorial authority.110
Given a blank slate, New York would have divergent
models to choose from. This state has, however, already opted
for a modified ―direct file‖ system for children under the age of
sixteen: the Juvenile Offender Act, enacted in 1978,
encompasses children over the age of fourteen charged with
specified violent felonies, including robbery (first and second
degree) and first degree sexual offenses, as well as children
over the age of thirteen charged with murder.111 Such cases
are initially filed in the criminal courts but are later ―removed‖
to the Family Court once the child is convicted of a lesser
crime, or ―removed‖ for other reasons in the discretion of the
court (usually with the consent of the relevant District
Attorney).112
It would be impractical, if not unthinkable, to treat
children above the age of sixteen who have committed a
juvenile offense more leniently than their younger brethren.
Ergo, the definition of a ―juvenile offender‖ would undoubtedly
be amended to encompass persons under the age of eighteen. A
more difficult question is whether to expand the list with
additional violent felonies, i.e., to augment the definition for
108. Defined as first degree assault in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
120.10 (McKinney 2009).
109. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 28, at 37-48.
110. See id.
111. See Act of July 20, 1978, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1, 2.
112. Id.
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the older age group.113 (A juvenile offender would hence be a
child over the age of thirteen, or fourteen, or sixteen, depending
upon the crime charged.) One further complication is the
unique sentencing structure for juvenile offenders, which is
more stringent than a delinquency disposition but less
stringent than an adult sentence.114 The question remains
whether the sentencing structure should be altered for older
adolescents. Moreover, the complicated procedures governing
the transfer of juvenile offenders from state training schools to
prisons would also need to be amended if the jurisdictional age
was increased.115
Another issue in raising the jurisdictional age limitation
concerns prosecution. In virtually every other state, the
criminal court prosecutorial authority also prosecutes juvenile
delinquency cases in the juvenile or family court.116 This is not
so in New York.
Prosecution117 is almost always the
responsibility of a civil authority, namely the local County
Attorney or Corporation Counsel.118 However, for the more
serious violent felony cases, known as ―designated felonies,‖ the
District Attorney may enter into an agreement with the civil
authority whereby the District Attorney assumes prosecution119
and, of course, would then prosecute the juvenile offender in
the criminal courts. New York could choose to continue the
present pattern, which would shift the bulk of cases involving
fifteen and sixteen-year-old children to the county attorneys
and corporation counsels, or it could alter the present

113. A ―juvenile offender‖ would hence need to be defined as a child over
the age of thirteen, or fourteen, or sixteen, depending upon the crime
charged.
114. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05 (McKinney 2009).
115. At the other end of the crime spectrum, virtually every state
excludes traffic offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. That exclusion
would also be automatic in New York, which, under the Family Court Act, a
―juvenile delinquent‖ is defined as a person under the specified age who
commits a ―crime,‖ thereby excluding all offenses less than misdemeanors,
including traffic infractions, such as running a red light or speeding. See
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2008).
116. H. Ted Rubin, Prosecutors in Juvenile Court: Compatibility and
Conflict, JUV. JUST. UPDATE, Feb./Mar. 2008, at 1.
117. The Family Court Act uses the term ―presentment.‖
118. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 254.
119. See id. § 254-a.
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arrangement by adopting a bifurcated prosecutorial system.120
The impact of expanded juvenile delinquency jurisdiction
on the judiciary is obvious, although the precise weight is
difficult to gauge. Close to half of the arrests of all children
under the age of eighteen involve youngsters who are sixteen or
seventeen.121 Hence, the Family Court‘s juvenile delinquency
caseload could potentially almost double. However, the more
serious violent cases would likely remain within the criminal
court structure, and those cases place a greater demand on
judicial resources than the law seriously cares. The caseload
allocation between criminal and family courts would depend
upon where the Legislature drew the line between ―juvenile
delinquents‖ and ―adults‖ for criminal purposes. Regardless of
the allocation, however, the Family Court and the agencies
that service the Court, would witness a major upsurge in
juvenile
delinquency
cases—cases
that
constitute
approximately ten percent of the overall caseload.122 That
increase would be balanced by a commensurate decrease in the
criminal courts‘ caseload.
An adjustment to the age limitation would also place an
increased burden on post-dispositional resources. At present,
an older adolescent offender is detained in local jails and, when
incarcerated, is housed in local jails (for misdemeanors) or in
State Department of Correctional prisons (for felonies).
Children under the age of sixteen are detained in local
detention facilities, and, when deprived of their freedom, are
housed mainly in state training schools operated by the State
Office of Children and Family Services, or alternatively, in
private residential programs.123 Adjusting the age would
120. A bifurcated prosecutorial system could involve an arrangement
whereby one prosecutorial authority handles cases when the respondent is
under the age of sixteen at the time of the commission of the offense, while a
different authority prosecutes those individuals over the age of sixteen.
However, this bifurcated system would create a complicated scheme,
particularly if a case included co-respondents of different ages.
121. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
122. Surprisingly, in recent years the Legislature has significantly
increased the Family Court‘s jurisdiction without a commensurate increase in
its resources. Examples include raising the age of persons in need of
supervision, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 2009) (raising the age from
sixteen to eighteen), and requiring frequent permanency hearings when a
child is in placement, see id. § 1089.
123. See id. § 353.3 (McKinney 2008).
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consequently increase the training school and detention center
population, and decrease the jail and prison population,
although the exact re-allocation would, again, depend upon
where the Legislature ―drew the line.‖ Given significantly
decreasing crime rates and a renewed emphasis on community
based services, Office of Children and Family Service facilities
are under-populated, and the agency has consequently had to
Hence, the system could
close residential facilities.124
accommodate an increased population.
Some physical
expansion might nevertheless be needed, and operating costs
would surely increase. Non-secure detention is available in
every county in the State, but would probably need
augmentation.
Secure detention poses a more difficult
problem. The number of facilities is very small and they are
often far removed from a given geographic area. Even a
limited expansion would pose financial and logistical problems.
Finally, I hazzard a very rough generalization of the
overall operational fiscal repercussions. The number of arrests

124. See Press Release, N.Y. Office of Children & Family Servs.
(―OCFS‖), New York State Office of Children and Family Services
Accelerating Transformation of State Juvenile Justice System (Jan. 11,
2008),
available
at
http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/news/2008/2008_01_11_juvenilejusticetrans
formation.asp (stating that the Commissioner of OCFS ―announced the
closing of six underutilized residential facilities‖ and the partial closing of
several additional facilities). The OCFS residential facilities or training
schools are not problem-free. In fact, the United States Department of
Justice has recently cited the agency for physically abusing the children in its
custody, maintaining an inadequate monitoring system, overusing
psychotropic drugs, and lacking sufficient mental health staff. See Letter
from Loretta King, Acting Assistant Att‘y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep‘t
of Justice, to Hon. David A. Paterson, N.Y. Governor (Aug. 8, 2009), available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/NY_juvenile_facilities_findlet_0814-2009.pdf. OCFS is attempting to address the sobering findings and will
presumably remedy or at least partially remedy the situation. In any event,
children who are placed in state custody enjoy greater constitutional rights
than adult prisoners. See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1437 n.3
(9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring) (―The ‗evolving standards of
decency‘ against which courts evaluate the constitutionality of the conditions
certainly provide greater protection for juveniles than for adults.‖). The
sixteen-year-old incarcerated in a local or state prison faces even worse
conditions, and of course the great majority of youngsters who are found
guilty of engaging in criminal conduct are not placed or incarcerated. The
jurisdictional age limitation and the conditions of confinement are distinct
and separate issues.
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and cases would not change to any significant extent and the
total governmental expenditures should accordingly stay
roughly comparable to the contemporary system. Raising the
jurisdictional age, however, would trigger a significant
financial reallocation. Misdemeanor cases, which constitute a
large majority of the proceedings, would move from the locally
funded city and justice courts to the state funded Family Court.
A substantial number of felony proceedings would likewise be
heard in Family Court, as opposed to the County or Supreme
Courts. Defense costs would be borne by the State, which
funds the representation of children in Family Court, as
opposed to the counties, which largely fund criminal defense
representation. Prosecution services are primarily county
funded in both Family and Criminal Courts, and should
therefore remain relatively constant.
Detention and
incarceration of adults convicted of misdemeanor violations are
primarily local or county charges, whereas the detention and
custodial placement of children are State charges. In sum,
unless the current fiscal rules and policies are modified, raising
the jurisdictional age would result in significant State fiscal
obligations—judicial and executive—with a commensurate
decrease of the local funding burden.
The financial
reallocations would be relatively gradual, since full
implementation would require a four or five year time span.
Conclusion
Juvenile and Family Courts were established throughout
the country at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Originally, their jurisdictional scope was limited to children
under the age of sixteen, but by the end of the twentieth
century, virtually every state had expanded jurisdiction to
encompass sixteen and seventeen-year-old children; in fact, the
progression was largely completed by 1940. New York has
followed the national norm by raising, albeit belatedly, the
jurisdictional age for every cause of action, save juvenile
delinquency. For delinquency, and only for delinquency, this
State has adhered to the original, circa 1900, restriction. A
major endeavor to raise New York‘s jurisdictional age was
mounted in the 1930s, but it fell short. Subsequently, a similar
movement almost succeeded at the 1961 State Constitutional
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Convention, which established the Family Court; but when the
dust settled, New York maintained the age restriction as a
―temporary‖ measure pending a promised legislative initiative.
The ―temporary‖ compromise has remained in effect for fortyeight years.
The reasons for the national age-eighteen consensus are
not difficult to decipher. The overwhelming percentage of
criminal acts committed by adolescents are minor, and
predominately include larceny, vandalism, auto theft, and
misdemeanor assault. The recidivism rate is low—nationally,
approximately two-thirds of all juveniles who are arrested
never re-offend. Ergo, it makes little sense to subject these
children to criminal prosecution, penalties, and records, as
opposed to juvenile court remedies, including when
appropriate, placement in a residential facility. For the small
minority of children who have committed violent felony acts,
every State provides a mechanism to shift prosecution to the
adult criminal court. The public is thereby protected, while
most children are appropriately adjudicated in a more
ameliorative environment, one which focuses on the child‘s best
interests and maintains a high degree of confidentiality. The
national consensus has been recently affirmed by several
developments, including a significant decrease in the juvenile
crime rate, studies proving that children who are prosecuted as
adults—as in New York—have far higher recidivison rates, and
twenty-first century neurological research proving the
diminished judgment capacity, competency, and hence,
responsibility, of adolescents.
There is no reason why New York cannot, or should not,
join the rest of the nation. We would, after all, be the
penultimate State or, perhaps, the very last State. The public
benefits are manifest, as are the benefits to New York‘s
children. The only missing element, at least thus far, has been
the lack of political will, both at the community and the
legislative levels. It is surely time to commence a public and
legislative dialogue, and to seriously consider the advantages of
increasing the jurisdictional age limitation.
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